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DURABLE CONSENT AND A STRONG TRANSITIONAL
PEACEKEEPING PLAN: THE SUCCESS OF UNTAET IN
LIGHT OF THE LESSONS LEARNED IN CAMBODIA
Dianne M. Criswellt
Abstract: In 1999, East Timor voted for independence from Indonesia. That same
year the United Nations Security Council created the United Nations Transitional
Authority in East Timor ("UNTAET") to help East Timor transition to democracy, self-
governance, and sustainable development. Seven years earlier, the United Nations
launched a similar mission in Cambodia called the United Nations Transitional Authority
in Cambodia ("UNTAC"). There are many similarities between East Timor and
Cambodia, and both UNTAET and UNTAC are second-generation United Nations
peacekeeping missions. UNTAC and UNTAET had similar mandates, including
security, civil administration, and elections. UNTAC encountered opposition from the
Cambodian parties, and consent for its mandate eroded. UNTAET fulfilled its mandate,
because it had broad consent bases for its mission. UNTAET also had a comprehensive
transitional plan that integrated the East Timorese and organized its components, United
Nations agencies, and external organizations. Given UNTAET's success, it is evident
that designing peacekeeping missions to ensure intricate coordination between various
constituencies and organizations improves the outcome. Gathering and maintaining
broad consent is thus a necessary condition for successful UN peacekeeping missions,
especially missions designed to rebuild governments, infrastructure, and civil society.
I. INTRoDUCrION
The United Nations ("UN") has entered a new phase, characterized by
political solutions to interstate or internal conflicts with the consent of the
parties, which experts label second-generation peacekeeping. 1  This
illustrates the new function that the UN can play in stabilization and
I The author would like to thank Professor Dan Bodansky for his comments and advice. The author
would also like to thank the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal Editorial Staff for their help and support.
Any errors or omissions are the author's own.
STEVEN R. RATNER, THE NEW UN PEACEKEEPING: BUILDING PEACE IN LANDS OF CONFLICT
AFTER THE COLD WAR 17 (1995); John MacKinlay and Jarat Chopra, Second Generation Multinational
Operations, 15 WASH. Q. 113, 113-31 (1992); see also MICHAEL M. DOYLE, UN PEACEKEEPING IN
CAMBODIA: UNTAC's CIVIL MANDATE 76-80 (1995) (listing three categories of peacekeeping: first-
generation or "traditional" peacekeeping, in which unarmed or lightly armed UN forces are stationed to
monitor a truce, troop withdrawal, or to act as a buffer zone; second-generation peacekeeping, in which the
UN creates a consensual basis for a restoration of law and order in domestic crises and tries to implement
its global humanitarian agenda; and, third-generation peacekeeping in which low-level military operations
protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance, enforce cease-fires, and assist in the rebuilding of failed
states without a state's consent).
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democratization of states.2 The United Nations Transitional Authority in
East Timor ("UNTAET") and the United Nations Transitional Authority in
Cambodia ("UNTAC") represent the emergence of this new generation of
peacekeeping. UNTAET was established seven years after UNTAC and
demonstrates how the UN has changed its approach in order to better fulfill
its peacekeeping mandate. UNTAET has benefited from two factors that
were absent from UNTAC: durable consent and a comprehensive
transitional plan. This Comment explores the similarities and differences in
the UNTAET and UNTAC cases to illuminate the transformations in
second-generation UN peacekeeping.
This Comment discusses the background of UNTAC and UNTAET in
Parts II and III. Part IV notes the overall differences and similarities of
UNTAC and UNTAET. Part V provides an overview of international law
and the role of consent in UN peacekeeping. This section examines the
differing qualities of consent in the UNTAC and UNTAET cases, and
observes the disintegration of consent in Cambodia and the durability of
consent in East Timor. Part VI explores the scope and strength of these
transitional plans. Part VII suggests that the cases of UNTAC and UNTAET
demonstrate that the UN must vigorously pursue broad consent for its
actions, and that transitional missions are valid and worthwhile. This
Comment concludes that the successes and failures of UNTAET and
UNTAC can help guide future UN peacekeeping missions. The two
missions demonstrate that durable consent and a strong transitional plan are
necessary preconditions for a successful UN transitional authority.
II. BACKGROUND OF UNTAC
A. Cambodia
Cambodia's twentieth century history begins in the era of post-
colonialism. In 1863, France established a protectorate over Cambodia,
which lasted until Cambodia was granted independence in 1953.' In 1970,
General Lon Nol led a coup d'etat and overthrew Prince Sihanouk.4 The
new government, led by military and civilian conservatives, renamed the
2 Hansjorg Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United Nations
Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 A.J.I.L. 46, 46-47 (2001) (discussing the unprecedented UN role in
East Timor and Kosovo, in which peacekeeping missions were given a comprehensive mandate that
empowered the mission to exercise all legislative and executive authority).
3 DAVI P. CHANDLER, THE TRAGEDY OF CAMBODIAN HISTORY: POLMICs, WAR, AND REVOLUTION
SINCE 1945, at 67-72 (1991).
4 Id. at 197-99.
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country the Khmer Republic and allied itself with the United States in the
Vietnam War.5 In 1975, the opposition communists (Khmer Rouge) gained
power after a five-year civil war and established Democratic Kampuchea
("DK"). 6 Over the next three to four years, the Khmer Rouge attempted to
restructure Cambodia into a communal agrarian society, a process that
produced more than a million deaths through political executions, starvation,
and disease.7
In 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia in response to Democratic
Kampuchea's savage border raids into Vietnamese territory.8 Within a year,
Vietnam occupied the capitol, Phnom Penh and set up a puppet regime, the
People's Republic of Kampuchea ("PRK"). 9 Following the PRK's takeover,
control over Cambodian territory was divided and the Vietnamese army had
control over most of the country. 10 The Khmer Rouge and two other
iresistance groups, the Front Uni Nationale Pour Un Camodge Ind~pendant,
Neutre, Pacifique, et Coop&atif ("FUNCINPEC") and the Khmer People's
National Liberation Front ("KPNLF"), controlled small areas and created a
united opposition front called the Coalition Government of Democratic
Kampuchea ("CGDK")."l
During the 1980s, pressure was increasing on Cambodian factions to
reach a peace agreement. Cold War animosities broke down, and states that
supported different Cambodian factions cut off military aid, expressing an
interest in resolving the ongoing conflict. 12  UN General Assembly
resolutions on Cambodia passed with ever larger majorities, reiterating the
need for settlement and restoration of Cambodian independence and
territorial integrity. 13 Several attempts were made to find a diplomatic
resolution of the conflict in the 1980s. For example, Indonesia and other
Association of Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN") member states
convened the Jakarta Informal Meetings to bring together the four
Cambodian factions for talks. 14  However, peace negotiations at these
meetings, as well as others, stalled. 15
5 RATNER, supra note 1, at 140.
6 CHANDLER, supra note 3, at 192-235.
7 Karl D. Jackson, Introduction: The Khmer Rouge in Context, in CAMBODIA 1975-1978:
RENDEZVOUS WITH DEATH 3 (Karl D. Jackson ed., 1989).
RATNER, supra note 1, at 140.
I Id.
10 Id.
Id. at 142.
12 TREVOR FINDLAY, CAMBODIA: THE LEGACY AND LESSONS OF UNTAC 3-4 (1995).
13 RATNER, supra note 1, at 141 (citing M. R. Sakhumbhand Paribatra, Can ASEAN Break the
Stalemate?, 3 WORLD POL'Y J. 85 (1985)).
'4 FINDLAY, supra note 12, at4-10.
'5 id.
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Australia proposed an enhanced role for the UN in the peace
settlement as a strategy to overcome the stalemate. 16 The five permanent
members of the Security Council agreed that this was necessary and drafted
a compromise plan in which the UN would exercise direct supervision or
control over the civilian administration for five 4,ears-a critical step to
create the preconditions for free and fair elections.' In Paris on October 23,
1991, the parties signed the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political
Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict ("Paris Agreement").' 8 The four
Cambodian factions agreed to form the Supreme National Council ("SNC")
with six representatives from the PRK, or the State of Cambodia ("SOC") as
it had renamed itself, and two from each of the three resistance parties.
1 9
The agreement also provided that Prince Sihanouk would act as president of
the SNC.2 °
The Paris Agreements invited the UN to establish UNTAC under the
direct responsibility of the Secretary-General to keep the peace, oversee the
21civil administration, monitor human rights, and organize elections.
Although the different Cambodian factions would continue to exercise
governmental functions in the areas they controlled, the UN would ensure
22that they acted in a manner sufficiently neutral for elections. In fact, the
UN would embark upon a new approach to elections, both by organizing and
by conducting them.2 3  In February 1992, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 745, establishing UNTAC in accordance with the mandate of the
Paris Agreement. 24
16 See The Situation in Cambodia: Report of the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Agenda
Item 3, U.N. Doc. A145/605 (1990). For detailed discussion of the United Nation's role in the peace
process, see also THE UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA (UNTAC): DEBRIEFING
AND LESSONS 3-8 (Nassrine Azimi ed., 1995).
17 Letter dated 30 August 1990from the Permanent Representatives of China, France, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United
States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/45/472-S/21689 (1990).
I Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, U.N. GAOR, 46th
Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/46/608-S/23177 (1991).
19 RATNER, supra note 1, at 146. See Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the
Cambodia Conflict, supra note 18, at 11-12.
20 Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, supra note 18, at 9.
21 Id. at 10.
22 RATNER, supra note 1, at 145.
23 Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, supra note 18, at
25-27.
24 S.C. Res. 745, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/745 (1992).
VOL. 11 No. 3
TRANSITIONAL PEACEKEEPING IN UNTAETAND UNTAC 581
B. UNTAC
UNTAC's powers were grounded in the Paris Agreement and
expanded the UN's peacekeeping role. "UNTAC was a landmark mission
that clearly symbolized a new generation of peacekeeping operations in its
scope of mandate and size of deployment. The civilian components of
UNTAC took on very ambitious functions of state-building unprecedented in
the history of UN peacekeeping." 25 The UN was committed to the largest
field operation in its history, with a mandate to produce a "just and durable
settlement to the Cambodia conflict" on the basis of free and fair elections in
a neutral political environment within a "period not to exceed eighteen
months. ' '2
The UNTAC mandate included both military and civil functions.
27
Under the military mandate, UNTAC was charged with the responsibility of
verifying the withdrawal of foreign forces, controlling and reducing arms,
and assisting with the release of all prisoners of war and civilian internees.28
Under the general category of the civil mandate, UNTAC had responsibility
for the civil administration, elections, human rights, civilian police,
rehabilitation, and information. 29 Thus, all administrative agencies were
under UNTAC's direct control. This administrative plan differed from
previous UN peacekeeping missions, in which the UN inserted personnel
into the state's own bureaucracy to improve the administrative machinery as
"technical assistance."30 In contrast, UNTAC was authorized to take partial
control over the civil administration of a member state.3'
Two aspects of the Paris Agreements were problematic for UNTAC in
fulfilling its mandate. The first was the power-sharing relationship between
the SNC and UNTAC in civil administration. The settlement was designed
to balance the need to respect Cambodian wishes with the urgency of
implementing the settlement; thus, the SNC retained legal authority under
UNTAC administrative oversight if its views were unanimous and its advice
25 DOYLE, supra note 1, at 36.
2 Mats Berdal & Michael Leifer, Cambodia, in THE NEW INTERVENTIONISM 1991-1994: THE
UNITED NATIONS EXPERIENCE IN CAMBODIA, FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND SOMALIA 25, 36 (James Mayall
ed., 1996); see also S.C. Res. 745, supra note 24.
27 Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doe. S/23613
(1992).
2s Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, supra note 18, at
24-25.
29 Id. See also DOYLE, supra note 1, at 36.
30 RATNER, supra note 1, at 149.
31 id.
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was consistent with the governing agreement. 32 While this relationship gave
UNTAC a large amount of administrative power, the Cambodian factions
later used it to block UNTAC reforms.33 The second problem was the
disconnect between UNTAC's mandate to organize and conduct fair and
free elections and its other mandate to verify the cease-fire of armed
factions. Although elections proceeded somewhat smoothly, UNTAC was
unable to demilitarize and demobilize the armed factions, to protect human
rights or to create a genuine "neutral political environment" before
conducting elections.
34
Im. BACKGROUND OF UNTAET
A. East Timor
35
East Timor was a colonial holding of Portugal until 1974, when
36Portugal announced its intention to decolonize. Portugal planned to
participate in East Timor's transition to independence with a Portuguese
High Commissioner and a transitional government until 1978.37 Three
major East Timorese political parties emerged in this context, each with a
different vision for post-colonial East Timor: the Revolutionary Front for an
Independent East Timor ("FRETLIN"); the Democratic Union of East
Timor ("UDT"); and the Timorese Democratic People's Union
("APODETI"). 38  The parties disagreed on whether independence from
Portugal should be immediate or gradual, and whether East Timor should
integrate with Indonesia. 39  They initially agreed on a self-determination
32 Id.
33 MAcALsSTER BROWN & JOSEPH J. ZASLOFF, CAMBODIA CONFOUNDS THE PEACEMAKERS, 1979-
1998, at 107-08 (1998) (assessing that UNTAC's administrative control was never more than partial);
RATNER, supra note 1, at 158-60 (explaining that two major parties in the SNC-the SOC and the Khmer
Rouge-refused to cooperate with UNTAC); Id. at 185-86 (reporting on the deteriorating relationship
between UNTAC and the SNC).
34 Berdal & Leifer, supra note 26, at 36.
35 See generally East Timor-UNTAET Background (United Nations 2001) at http://www.un.org/
peace/etimor/UntaetB.htm (providing background information on UNTAET).
36 EAST TIMOR AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: BASIC DOCUMENTS xix (Heike Krieger, ed.,
Cambridge University Press 1997) [hereinafter BASIC DOCUMENTS]. For a more detailed discussion of the
colonial history of East Timor, see generally JAMES DUNN, TIMOR: A PEOPLE BETRAYED (1983).
37 BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 36, at xix (citing Summary of Outcome of Macao Talks between
Portugal, APODE7I and UDT, June 26-28, 1975, 46 AUSTL. FOREIGN AFF. REC. 413 (1975)).fs See generally John G. Taylor, Decolonisation, Independence and Invasion, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE QUESTION OF EAST TIMOR 21 (1995) (laying out the different political parties in post-
colonial East Timor).
39 IAN MARTIN, SELF-DETERMINATION IN EAST TIMOR: THE UNITED NATIONS, THE BALLOT AND
INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 15-16 (2001).
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process, aided by the Portuguese, to hold elections and institute a popular
assembly. 40 However, this plan was never implemented because the
Portuguese withdrew after civil war broke out between the parties in August
1975.41 FRETILIN gained control of most of the territory and declared the
independence of East Timor.42 The other two parties, the UDT and
APODETI, declared independence from Portugal and sought integration
with Indonesia.43 The UDT and APODETI coalition asked for Indonesian
intervention to "protect the lives and property of the people of Portuguese
Timor who regarded themselves as Indonesian citizens." Indonesia
answered this call on December 7, 1975 and invaded East Timor.45
Indonesia gained control over East Timor and the pro-Indonesian parties
declared the Provisional Government of East Timor and established a
Regional Popular Assembly.4 6 When the assembly petitioned Indonesia to
formally integrate East Timor, Indonesia accepted, and East Timor became a
province on July 17, 1976.47
FRETILIN condemned the integration and claimed that the process
was illegitimate. 48  As Indonesia struggled to maintain control over East
Timor, mounting violence, along with famine and disease, claimed hundreds
of thousands of lives as FRETILIN's armed wing resisted the integration of
40 BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 36, at xix.
41 id.
42 Id. at xx, 39-40 (citing Letter from the Chargi d'affaires a. i. of the Permanent Mission of Portugal
to the United Nations, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/10402 (1975); Communiqug Issued by the
Portuguese National Decolonization Commission, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/10403-
S/1 1890 (1975)).
43 MARTIN, supra note 39, at 16.
44 BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 36, at 40-41 (providing the text of the document: Joint
Proclamation by APODETI, UDT, KOTA and the Partido Trabilhista, Issued at Batugade, U.N. GAOR,
30th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/808 (1975)).
45 MARTIN, supra note 39, at 16.
4 ld; see BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 36, at 46 (providing the text of the document: Statement
Made by Mr. Arnaldo dos Reis Araujo, Chief Executive of the Provisional Government of East Timor on
the Occasion of Presenting to President Suharto the Petition of the People of East Timor Addressed to the
Government and the People of the Republic of Indonesia, U.N. GAOR, 31' Sess., Annex IV, U.N. Doc.
A/31/109-S/12097 (1976)).
47 BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 36, at xx. For a full account of Indonesia's invasion and its impact
on East Timor, see JOHN G. TAYLOR, INDONESIA'S FORGOTTEN WAR: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF EAST
TIMOR (1991).
48 BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 36, at xxi-xxiii. For a discussion comparing the East Timorese
claim to self-determination versus the Indonesian assertion that it did not violate that right, see id.; see also
Gerry J. Simpson, The Politics of Self-Determination in the Case Concerning East Timor, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE QUESTION OF EAST TIMOR, supra note 38, at 251-68; see also Paula
Escarameia, The Meaning of Self-Determination and the Case of East Timor, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE QUESTIOS OF EAST TIMOR, supra note 38, at 119-50.
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East Timor and the Indonesian military suppressed supporters of
independence.49
The continuing repression and violence in East Timor gained.
international attention in 1991 when Portugal, which never formally
abandoned its formal responsibilities in East Timor, brought a case to the
International Court of Justice, claiming that Australia violated East Timorese
rights by signing the Timor Gap Treaty with Indonesia.50 The second major
event was the massacre at Santa Cruz Cemetery. Following a crackdown on
independence supporters, a mass was held on November 12, 1991 for a
young student killed by Indonesian soldiers.5 1 A large crowd assembled
outside the church and walked to the cemetery, shouting pro-independence
slogans, and gathering more participants along the way.52  As the
participants gathered in the walled cemetery, Indonesian troops arrived and
opened fire on them.5 3 Estimated numbers of those killed and missing range
from 85 to 600. s4
In response to Indonesia's actions, the Security Council adopted two
resolutions. The first, Resolution 384, recognized East Timor's territorial
integrity and its right to self-determination and called upon Indonesia to
withdraw from the territory.55  The Council echoed these sentiments in
Resolution 389, passed a year later.5 6 Despite these and other resolutions
49 MARTIN, supra note 39, at 16-17. For a more detailed discussion of the continuing violence
between the Indonesian military and pro-independence forces, and for a history of human rights abuses in
East Timor under Indonesian control, see JOHN G. TAYLOR, EAST TIMOR: THE PRICE OF FREEDOM 79-91
(1999). Estimated East Timorese deaths under Indonesian rule are 200,000 out of a population of 700,000.
Lauri Hannikainen, The Case of East Timor from the Perspective of Jus Cogens, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE QUESTION OF EAST TIMOR, supra note 38, at 107-08. For an analysis of Indonesia's violations of
international law on human rights, see Daniel Machover, International Humanitarian Law and the
Indonesian Occupation of East Timor, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE QUESTION OF EAST TIMOR, supra
note 38, at 205-22.
50 BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 36, at xx. Also in 1991, Indonesian authorities sentenced Xanana
Gusm o, the East Timor resistance leader, to life in prison. Id. See Roger S. Clark, The Substance of the
East Timor Case in the ICJ, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE QUESTION OF EAST TIMOR, supra note 38, at
243-50.
5' TAYLOR, EAST TIMOR: THE PRICE OFFREEDOM, supra note 49, at xiii.
52 Id.
53 Id. See BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 36, at 259-61 (providing the text of the following
documents: Report by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Amos Wako, Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights
Resolution 1991/71, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 12, U.N. Doc. EJCN.4/1992/30 (1992); UN Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Resolution 1992/20: Situation
in East Timor, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/2 (1992)).
'4 BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 36, at xx (explaining that 85 deaths were acknowledged by
Indonesian authorities, but that non-governmental organizations reported up to 600 deaths).
55 Id. at 53 (providing the text for the document: S.C. Res. 384, U.N. SCOR, 34th Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/384 (1979)).
56 Id. at 93 (providing the text for the document: S.C. Res. 389, U.N. SCOR, 31' Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/389 (1976)). In addition, the General Assembly adopted its first resolution opposing Indonesia's
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upholding their principles, neither the Security Council nor the General
Assembly characterized Indonesia's actions as expressly illegal or a
violation of the use of force. 57  Further, the Security Council failed to
recommend sanctions against Indonesia. 58 Nevertheless, the majority view
in the UN was that there was no valid act of self-determination by the East
Timorese to legitimize Indonesia's authority. 59 "In general, UN practice
supports the view that the Indonesian invasion of East Timor was illegal,
although State practice was not uniform and the strong condemnation one
finds in other cases of intervention is lacking."' 6 The General Assembly
passed Resolution 37/30, charging the Secretary-General with the mandate
to find diplomatic solutions to the self-determination debate over East
Timor.61 However, this mandate yielded little progress.
62
In the mid 1990s, problems in East Timor attracted even more
international attention and unfolding events suggested growing pressure for
settlement. For example, Indonesia reached an agreement with the UN that
human rights and humanitarian organizations could have access to East
Timor.63 In 1995, the UN arranged the first meeting of the All-Inclusive
Intra-East Timorese Dialogue ("AIIETD"). 64 The 1996 Nobel Peace Prize
awarded to two East Timorese from very different spheres of public life-
Bishop Belo and the chief foreign representative of the resistance, Jos6
Ramos-Horta-also raised East Timor's profile internationally. 65 In 1997,
the new UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan revitalized his role by appointing
a Personal Representative ("PRSG") to East Timor.66 As one commentator
actions: Resolution 3485. Id. at 123 (providing the text of the document: U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., U.N.
Doe. A/I1023/Rev.1 (1975)).
57 Id. at xxiii. See Roger S. Clark, The 'Decolonisation' of East Timor and the United Nations
Norms on Self-Determination and Aggression, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE QUESTION OF EAST
TIMOR, supra note 38, at 65-102.
58 BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 36, at xxiii.
59 Id.
60 Id. An even stronger view criticizing the absence of UN action: "Although no country save
Australia had ever recognized the legitimacy of Indonesia's annexation of East Timor, the U.N. Security
Council had always treated it as an internal Indonesian problem." James Traub, Inventing East Timor (The
Need to Completely Rebuild the Economy in East Timor), 79 FOREIGN AFF. 74,75 (2000).
61 MARTIN, supra note 39, at 18.
62 la
63 Id
6 Id. For background on the AIIETD, see Tessa Piper, East Timor: Prospects for Resolution 16-22
(WRITENET for the United Nations Human Rights Committee Centre for Documentation and Research
1995) at http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/country/writenetwriidn.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2001).
65 Anthony Goldstone, East Timor: A Difficult Transition 4 (WRITENET for the United Nations
Human Rights Committee Centre for Documentation and Research 1999) at http//www.unhcr.ch/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/rsd/+2wwBmerFJ69wwwwMwwwwwwwtFqAw5BaRoMdGcFqo-uPPyEROMFmqDFqm
7y-dFlt2IygZf3zmbwwwwwwwGFqmRT7BFqtEIg207/rsddocview.pdf.
MARTIN, supra note 39, at 18.
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has noted, 'The UN role became increasingly proactive, with visits to
Indonesia, Portugal, and East Timor itself., 67  In addition, the violence of
Indonesia's 1997 parliamentary elections led to a strong upsurge in guerrilla
activity in East Timor.
68
The fall of President Suharto on May 21, 1998, and the East Asian
economic crisis heralded great change for East Timor. The new President of
Indonesia, B. J. Habibie, offered East Timor "wide ranging" autonomy.
69
"On 27 January 1999, the Indonesian Government went further and
announced that it was prepared to 'let go' of East Timor if its people rejected
the autonomy package, effectively opening up the possibility of
independence for the territory. '70 However, the government's preference
71
was for East Timor to opt for wide-ranging autonomy. Moreover,
Indonesia was unwilling to administer a transition to independence should
72the East Timorese choose autonomy. If the East Timorese voted for
independence, then the process of separation was to be completed by
January 1, 2000.7
On May 5, 1999, the UN helped broker the peace settlement by
sponsoring talks between the occupying power, Indonesia, and Portugal,
which was still regarded as East Timor's administering power. The talks
concluded with an election plan to determine whether the East Timorese
wanted autonomy or independence from Indonesia.74 On May 5, 1999, they
signed the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese
67 Id.
6 Goldstone, supra note 65, at 4 (citing East Timor Working Paper Prepared by the Secretariat for
the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/AC.109/2111 (1998)).
69 Id. at 1. "President Habibie made his decision to bring an end to the question of East Timor out of
his own view of the interests of Indonesia (and in the belief that a vote for autonomy could be secured)
rather than in the interests of the East Timorese." MARTI, supra note 39, at 130.
70 Goldstone, supra note 65, at 1.
[T]he new President seems to have calculated that with the economy in a severe crisis
from which it would recover only with international support and with the military
apparently powerless to halt continuing social unrest throughout Indonesia itself, the
costs to Indonesia in terms of international standing, the diversion of military resources
and financial outlay outweighed the benefits of holding on to [East Timor].
Id. at 5.
71 Id. at 8.
7 id.
73 Id. "[lit also insisted that if the East Timorese voted for separation from Indonesia, their choice
would still have to be validated by Indonesia's highest constitutional body, the People's Consultative
Assembly." Id.
74 Id at 1. See Agreement Between Indonesia and Portugal on the Question of East Timor, U.N.
SCOR, 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1999/513 (1999).
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Republic on the question of East Timor ("Overall Agreement"), in which
they formally requested UN assistance in conducting elections.75  In
response, the UN signed the Agreement between the United Nations and the
Governments of Indonesia and Portugal Regarding the Modalities for fhe
Popular Consultation Through a Direct Ballot7 6 and the Agreement Between
the United Nations and the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal
Regarding Security Arrangements.77 In these agreements, the UN pledged to
organize and conduct elections in East Timor. Despite the positive
developments, violence committed by "pro-integrationist" militias delayed
progress.78 Evidence suggests that these militias were armed and backed by
the Indonesian military in the territory. 79  Nonetheless, the violence had
mostly subsided by May 5, 1999 when a peace agreement was forged
between pro-independence and pro-integration forces.
80
On July 11, 1999, the Security Council established the United Nations
Mission in East Timor ("UNAMET") to organize the popular consultation
on independence.81  On August 30, 1999, 98% of the East Timorese
population went to the polls and 78.5% voted for independence by rejecting
the proposed autonomy. 82 Following the announcement of the results, pro-
integration militias launched a campaign of violence.8 3  According to the
75 Agreement Between Indonesia and Portugal on the Question of East Timor, supra note 74.
76 Agreement Regarding the Modalities for the Popular Consultation of the East Timorese Through a
Direct Ballot, U.N. SCOR, 53de Sess., Annex II, at 24, U.N. Doc. S/1999/513 (1999).
77 East Timor Popular Consultation, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., Annex III at 29, U.N. Doc. S/1999/513
(1999).
A secure environment devoid of violence or other forms of intimidation is a prerequisite
for the holding of a free and fair ballot in East Timor. Responsibility to ensure such an
environment as well as for the general maintenance of law and order rests with the
appropriate Indonesian security authorities. The absolute neutrality of the TNI
(Indonesian Armed Forces) and the Indonesian Police is essential in this regard.
Id.
78 Goldstone, supra note 65, at 1.
79 ld. "The evidence for the Indonesian military's complicity with the militias is overwhelming." d
at 10. 'There is considerable evidence that at least some of them not only owe their existence to the armed
forces but have been fully integrated into the armed forces' structure." Id.
so Id.
s' S.C. Res. 1246, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1246 (1999).
82 Strohmeyer, supra note 2, at 63 n.2; see Secretary-General Informs the Security Council: People
of East Timor Rejected Special Autonomy Proposed by Indonesia (Sept. 3, 1999) at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990903.sc6721.htrnl.
83 The Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in East Timor, U.N. SCOR, 54 Sess., 3-5,
U.N. Doc. S/1999/1024 (1999). Toole criticizes the UN for failing to negotiate the most basic element of
their role in conducting and monitoring elections: security. Jennifer Toole, Notes and Comments: A False
Sense of Security: Lessons Learned From the United Nations Organization and Conduct Mission in East
Timor, 16 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 199 (2000). Compare MARTIN, supra note 39, at 130 ("[I]f the international
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Overall Agreement, Indonesia was responsible for maintaining peace and
security during the elections. 84 However, the Indonesian authorities did not
respond effectively to the violence, and many East Timorese were killed or
displaced from their homes after the elections. 85 Countries like Portugal and
Australia called for swift action by the UN to establish an international force
if the situation deteriorated. 86 Australia placed its troops on formal alert to
be ready to evacuate UNAMET or to lead a multilateral force on September
8th. 87 One week later, the Security Council authorized a multinational force
under Chapter VII, named "International Force, East Timor"
("INTERFET"), to restore order.88
On October 25, 1999, the Security Council established the UNTAET
with a broad mandate: to provide security and maintain law and order; to
establish an effective administration; to assist in the development of civil
and social services; to coordinate and deliver humanitarian, rehabilitation
and development assistance; to support capacity-building for self-
government; and to assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable
development.89
B. UNTAET
The groundwork for UNTAET was laid in the Overall Agreement
between Indonesia and Portugal of May 5, 1999.90 The Secretary-General's
community had been able to foresee the full scale of the violence after the ballot, it could not have
embarked upon the popular consultation.").
84 Agreement Between Indonesia and Portugal on the Question of East Timor, supra note 74, at 6.
85 For a detailed discussion of the violence surrounding the August 1999 election and the role of
UNAMET, see GUNS AND BALLOT BOXES: EAST TIMOR'S VOTE FOR INDEPENDENCE 117-34 (Damien
Kingsbury ed., Monash Asia Institute 2000); see also The Report on the Secretary-General on the Situation
in East Timor, supra note 83.
8 MARTIN, supra note 39, at 103.
'7 Id. at 114-15.
88 S.C. Res. 1264, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1264 (1999) (authorizing the
establishment of a multinational force with the following tasks: "to restore peace and security in East
Timor, to protect and support the United Nations Mission in East Timor in carrying out its tasks and, within
force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations ...."). See also The Report on the
Secretary-General on the Situation in East Timor, supra note 83, at 6-8; Letter Dated 15 October 1999
from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 54th Ses.,
U.N. Doc. S/1999/1072 (1999) (reporting the INTERFET's operations to the Security Council); Letter
Dated 29 October 1999 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,
U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1999/1106 (1999) (reporting the INTERFET's operations to the
Security Council); Letter Dated 12 November 1999from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President
of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1999/1169 (1999) (reporting the
INTERFET's operations to the Security Council).
89 S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (1999).
90 Agreement Between Indonesia and Portugal on the Question of East Timor, supra note 74.
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office was deeply involved in this process, and drafted proposals for
elections and the transition. 91 Three aspects of the Overall Agreement set
the preconditions for a durable peace plan. First, the Overall Agreement
requested the Secretary-General to implement elections in which East
Timorese would achieve self-determination by voting either to be
independent from Indonesia or to remain a part of Indonesia with a more
autonomous relationship.92 Second, the parties agreed to abide by the
outcome of the elections, even though they disagreed on the best final status
for East Timor.93 Third, the appendixes to the Overall Agreement set out
frameworks for implementing East Timor's status change following the
elections for both of the possible outcomes .94
UNTAET followed other UN missions in East Timor with more
restricted mandates. The UN established UNAMET to conduct the
elections, but did not charge it with maintaining peace and security. 95 After
Indonesia failed to stop the violence surrounding the 1999 elections,96 the
Security Council authorized the multinational force, INTERFET, to take all
necessary measures to protect and support UNAMET in its tasks.97 The
same Security Council resolution authorizing INTERFET also contemplated
a larger role for the UN in East Timor than that of UNAMET, namely one of
transitional administrator in a UN Peacekeeping operation to implement the
popular election.98  "In the wake of post-ballot violence [of the 1999
elections], the civil administration in East Timor was no longer functioning,
the judiciary and court systems had ceased to exist and essential services
were on the brink of collapse." 99  Following this reality, the Secretary-
General suggested in a report that UNTAET should be established under the
authority of the Security Council, vested in the Secretary-General, and
exercised by the Special Representative. °°  This report set out a
comprehensive plan for a UN transitional authority, listing seventy parts and
91 Agreement Regarding the Modalities for the Popular Consultation of the East Timorese Through a
Direct Ballot, supra note 76.
Agreement Between Indonesia and Portugal on the Question of East Timor, supra note 74, at 5.93 Id.
94 Agreement Regarding the Modalities for the Popular Consultation of the East Timorese Through a
Direct Ballot, supra note 76.
95 S.C. Res. 1246, supra note 81.
96 See, e.g., Jarat Chopra, Introductory Note to UNTAET Regulation 13, 39 I.L.M. 936 (2000)
(describing Indonesia's role in the violence of the 1999 elections).
97 S.C. Res. 1264, supra note 88.
98 Id. at I 11 (inviting the Secretary-General to "plan and prepare for a United Nations transitional
administration in East Timor, incorporating a United Nations peacekeeping operation ...").
99 Question of East Timor: Progress Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess.,
Agenda Item 96, at 7, 1 37, U.N. Doc. A/54/654 (1999).1oo The Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in East Timor, supra note 83.
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sub-parts of UNTAET's potential mandate. I0 1 This report proposed that
UNTAET would be empowered to exercise all legislative and executive
authority in East Timor.1 2 From its inception, policy makers envisioned
UNTAET with a broad mandate to fulfill a mission of unparalleled
dimensions.
The Security Council acted upon the report and established UNTAET
pursuant to its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 10 3 The Council
set out broad powers and responsibilities for UNTAET that closely followed
the mandate proposed in the Secretary-General's report.1°4  UNTAET's
mandate was set out in its founding instrument, Security Council Resolution
1272.10 The main components of its structure were: (1) a governance and
public administration component, including an international police force; (2)
a humanitarian assistance and emergency rehabilitation component; and (3)
a military component. 10 6  UNTAET regulations are highly detailed and
evince a comprehensive plan to reconstruct the political, legal, financial,
military, and civil components of East Timor.
10 7
UNTAET was charged with establishing an effective administration in
East Timor-a great challenge considering East Timor's state of
devastation.108  For example, UNTAET faced rebuilding a physical
infrastructure that had been mostly destroyed by civil war.l10 9 Another aspect
of restoration was the rebuilding of the judicial system in the absence of
basic essentials, like the lack of qualified professionals and law books.
110
101 Id.
102 id.
103 S.C. Res. 1272, supra note 89.
104 Id.
105 UNTAET was created by the Security Council in October 1999. S.C. Res. 1272, supra note 89.
106 Id. at 3.
107 UNTAET promulgated an incredibly detailed and comprehensive set of regulations addressing
every aspect of rebuilding East Timor. The regulation topics include legal reforms (civil and criminal),
economic reforms (budget and financial management, currency, appropriations), political reforms
(establishing the council of ministers, electoral offenses, electing a constituent assembly), police and
military reforms (prisons, police service, code of military discipline, East Timor defense force), and judicial
reforms (legal aid service, commission for reception, truth, and reconciliation). Report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., U.N.
Doc. S/2000/53 (2000). See UNTAET Regulations UNTAET/REG/2001/1-28, at http://www.un.org/
peace/etimor/untaetR/r-2001.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2002).
'o The challenge of establishing an administrative framework in East Timor was so great because
every level of infrastructure had to be reconstructed from scratch. Traub, supra note 60, at 77.
109 The Report on the Secretary-General on the Situation in East Timor, supra note 83, at 11-13.
" On the administration of the law in East Timor under the UNTAET plan, see generally
Strohmeyer, supra note 2:
The United Nations, which traditionally promotes international law, was actually
mandated, both in Kosovo and in East Timor, to legislate and create new law in areas that
normally fall within the competence of a national legislature. By promulgating UN
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UNTAET was also instructed to develop social services, as well as ensure
coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and
development assistance.11' However, while endowed with administrative
authority, the ultimate goal of UNTAET was to support capacity-building
for self-government. 12  UNTAET also was charged to assist in laying the
groundwork for sustainable development, a job that is just beginning, as the
economic viability of independent East Timor is only now becoming a
reality.113
UNTAET's mandate was remarkable for many reasons. First, the
breadth of the mandate contemplated a peacekeeping mission that went far
beyond the limits of past missions. The first generation of UN peacekeeping
had focused on running elections, promoting security, and helping to
implement peace agreements. 14  In addition to these traditional roles,
UNTAET was empowered to exercise all legislative and executive powers
and authorized to take all necessary measures to fulfill its mandate.115
UNTAET's mandate established a wide-ranging plan to rebuild government
and civil society.
regulations that have the status of laws and supersede any other law on the regulated
matter at issue, the head of the UN mission, in effect, becomes the exclusive legislator of
the administered territory.... As the experience in Cambodia has shown, many of these
regulations remain in force even after the completion of the UN transitional
administration, or serve as a blueprint for subsequent national legislation.
Id. at 63 n.4. See also S.C. Res. 1272, supra note 89, at 6 (stating that the Transitional Administrator will
have the power to enact new laws and regulations and to amend, suspend or repeal existing ones).
"' Daniel Fitzpatrick, Land Policy in Post-Conflict Circumstances: Some Lessons from East Timor,
in NEW ISSUES IN REFUGEE RESEARCH, WORKING PAPER NO. 58, 6 (WRITENET for the United Nations
Human Rights Committee Centre for Documentation and Research 2002) at http://www.unhcr.org
(estimating that 75% of the population was displaced-450,000 people were internally displaced and
300,000 fled or were forcibly transported across the border to West Timor); JAMES DUNN, CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY IN EAST TIMOR, JANUARY TO OCTOBER 1999: THEIR NATURE AND CAUSES 11 (1999),
at http:/www.etan.orgtetanpdf/pdfl/dunn.pdf (reporting that more than 500,000 Timorese, or more than
60% of the entire population of East Timor, were displaced); Strohmeyer, supra note 2, at 63 n.19(estimating that more than one-third of East Timor's pre-September 1999 population were temporarily
dislocated and that tens of thousands of people left their homes and escaped to safer locations in the
mountainous regions of East Timor).
112 The Security Council "[s]tresses the need for the Transitional Administration to consult and
cooperate closely with the East Timorese people in order to carry out its mandate effectively with a view to
the development of local democratic institutions, including an independent East Timorese human rights
institution, and the transfer to these institutions of its administrative and public service functions." S.C.
Res. 1272, supra note 89:
113 Goldstone, supra note 65, at 13. "East Timor lacks the most basic necessities: not just doctors,
dentists, accountants, lawyers, and police, but also tables, chairs, pots, and pans.... It would not be far
from the truth to say that East Timor has no economy." Traub, supra note 60, at 74.
:14 See generally PAUL F. DIEHL, INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING 21-28 (1994).
5" S.C. Res. 1272, supra note 89.
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The scope of UNTAET's authority was necessary for two reasons. In
the absence of local democratic institutions, UNTAET needed to be able to
fill the political void left by Indonesia. Second, East Timor was in such a
state of devastation and chaos that there was no infrastructure on which to
append a traditional peacekeeping mission. 16
IV. COMPARING AND CONTRASTING UNTAC AND UNTAET
Cambodia and East Timor both have colonial legacies and have
undergone upheaval in the latter half of the twentieth century. Both have
been ravaged by civil war for over twenty years and, at the time UN
peacekeeping missions were initiated, lacked basic infrastructure, civil
servants, or economic systems.' 17 However, there are significant differences
in their histories and their political and social contexts that affected the
prospect for success of UN peacekeeping and nation-building efforts.'
1 8
Internal differences and historical context are salient, because regional
historical developments impacted East Timor and Cambodia differently.
Unlike East Timor, Cambodia became a focus of twentieth century geo-
political struggles in Asia.1 19 Thus, Cold War political polarization had an
impact on the efficacy of the UN in Cambodia.
Also, the political situations in these countries were very different at
the time that peace settlements were proposed. There was broad support in
East Timor for the peace plan. 120 In contrast, although there was also
support among Cambodians for a peace plan, the provisions of the
settlement were contentious and the peace process was inadequate. 21 Based
on the premise of good faith, the Paris Agreements did not specifically
116 UNTAET staff members will never be able to forget the panorama of devastation that awaited
them upon their arrival in East Timor: most public and many private buildings ruined and smoldering in the
midst of what had once been towns and villages, now all but abandoned by their former inhabitants, cut off
from transport and communication, and lacking a governmental superstructure. Strohmeyer, supra note 2,
at 50. "[]lt was estimated that between sixty and eighty percent of all public and private buildings had been
destroyed in the violence of September 1999." Id. at 57.
1 7 RATNER, supra note 1, at 160.
116 Id. at 4 (cautioning that the predilection to label a UN mission, like UNTAC, either a success or
failure will not render a productive analysis because there may be exogenous factors beyond the control of
the mission that are unique to the country in which the mission takes place).
119 "At least for the last 200 or so years .... Cambodia has, to its detriment, been of interest to other
states not because of the aspirations of its people, but because of its position in the power struggles over
Indochina and Southeast Asia." RATNER, supra note 1, at 154.
120 See supra notes 74 to 82 and accompanying text.
121 FINDLAY, supra note 12, at 8.
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provide for enforcement or sanctions in the event of non-compliance by the
parties.
122
V. CONSENT
In 1992, then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined
peacekeeping as:
the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field,
hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally
involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and
frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that
expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and
the making of peace. 123
The competence of the UN to undertake peacekeeping operations lies
in its Charter. Because the UN Charter does not explicitly address
peacekeeping, 124 the peacekeeping powers of the UN are implied. Under
Article 1 of the UN Charter, one of the primary purposes of the UN is to
maintain international peace and security. The UN actions to maintain
peace and security are limited by Article 2, which cautions that nothing in
the Charter authorizes the UN to intervene into domestic matters.126 Many
in Id at 15.
123 RATNER, supra note 1, at 16 (citing An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking
and Peacekeeping, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit
Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 20, U.N. Doc.
A/47/277-S/24111 (1992)).
12 RATNER, supra note 1, at 30.
.2 U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1 provides:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression
of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful
means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment
or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the
peace.
Id.
126 U.N. CHARTER art.2, para. 1 provides:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall
require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but
this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter
VII.
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UN peacekeeping operations have been anchored in Chapter VI, which
describes the role of the UN in the peaceful settlement of disputes. 127  In
order to engage in efforts to create settlements and keep the peace between
disputing parties within a state, the UN requires the parties' consent, unless
acting pursuant to its Chapter VII enforcement powers. 128  Under Chapter
VII, the Security Council can authorize a peace enforcement plan without
the consent of the parties to the dispute when the situation is a threat to
international peace and security, and Article 2 does not limit UN actions
taken under this chapter. Although Chapter VII allows the Security Council
to authorize peace enforcement plans, there are many political and logistical
impediments to such endeavors. 129  While consent might not be legally
necessary for the UN to be competent to undertake peace enforcement
actions under Chapter VII, the parties' consent acts as an assurance that
peace settlements will be durable.' 30  In addition, consent to UN
peacekeeping maintains the principles of non-interference and sovereignty
set out in Article 2.131
Peacekeeping was only marginally effective before the Soviet Union
dissolved.132 Before that, UN peacekeeping missions did not engender much
hope for the resolution of conflicts, 133 because the Cold War polarized the
membership of the Security Council and members often used their veto
power to prevent any UN peace enforcement or peacekeeping actions.
1 34
While the efficacy of UN peacekeeping was in doubt during the Cold War,
new efforts in the late 1980s and early 1990s demonstrated that UN
127 "It has generally been assumed that peacekeeping falls under Chapter VI... They also depended
on the consent of the conflicting parties-thus reinforcing state sovereignty as the legal linchpin of
international society-and the circumstances where a ceasefire had been agreed, and there was therefore a
peace to keep." JAMEs MAYALL, Introduction, THE NEW INTERVENTIONISM, 1991-1994, at 7 (James
Mayall, ed., Cambridge University Press 1996). See generally RATNER, supra note 1, at 56-60.
128 [T]he principle of consent, first stated by Dag Hammarskjold in his 1956 report to the General
Assembly on the Sinai operation, serves to differentiate peacekeeping from the emplacement of UN
personnel in conflict situations without the parties' consent under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, what is
best termed peace enforcement. RATNER, supra note 1, at 17. For a more detailed discussion of consent
bases for UN peacekeeping missions, see id. at 25-41.
129 See, e.g., id. at 147-48 (explaining that the Security Council, which could have approved a peace
enforcement plan for Cambodia, did not want to impose a settlement upon unwilling parties; rather, the UN
presence was based on consent of the Cambodian government and the opposition parties, as it had been in
other second generation missions involving conflicts with an internal dimension).
130 See generally id. at 28-29.
131 See generally id. at 31-37.
132 Some argue that UN peacekeeping in this era was mere observation and possibly extended the
conflicts by removing incentives to settle the dispute. Id. at 10.
133 Id.
134 See generally DIEHL, supra note 114, at 21-28.
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peacekeeping efforts could be effective.' 35 In addition to the de-escalation
of Cold War politics, trends emerged that increased the need for UN
peacemaking and peacekeeping. Rising ethnic violence in Africa and the
Balkans required a collective response from UN members.' 36 Responding to
large-scale ethnic violence, the UN dispatched missions to areas including
Somalia, Rwanda, and Yugoslavia. 1  Another factor affecting the
development of UN peacekeeping was the number of states in transition to
independence or democracy in this period. To meet these needs, the UN
sent missions to Namibia, Haiti, South Africa, and eventually to Cambodia
and East Timor.
1 38
The UN established UNTAC and UNTAET under different chapters
of its charter. The Security Council authorized UNTAC under Chapter VI of
its charter 39 and UNTAET under Chapter VII.1 0 Consent was essential to
the role of the UN in East Timor, even though it was not legally required
under Chapter VII. Notwithstanding these different legal bases, the UN
peacekeeping missions in East Timor and Cambodia have similar consensual
bases. In both cases, the mission was based on the parties' initial consent to
a UN presence. Both settlement treaties provided very specific language
authorizing a UN transitional authority.' 4  In Cambodia and East Timor, the
character of the consent that the UN sought to use as its basis for authority
was broad because both the UNTAET and the UNTAC arose out of peace
settlements between interstate and intrastate parties.
42
What distinguishes the UNTAET from UNTAC is the quality of the
consent underpinning these missions. Durable, lasting consent is more
likely when all parties representing effective sources of power in the conflict
negotiate peace settlements out of a genuine spirit of reconciliation. 43 In the
135 JANET E. HEININGER, PEACEKEEPING IN TRANSITION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN CAMBODIA 3
(1994) (explaining the expansion of the UN's peacekeeping efforts from 1988 to 1993, in which it created
eighteen new peacekeeping operations, in comparison with thirteen during its first forty-three years).
136 RATNER, supra note 1, at 14-15.
37 RATNER, supra note 1, at 13; see generally David J. Scheffer, U.N. Engagement in Ethnic
Conflicts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC CONFLICT 147-77 (David Wippman ed., 1998).
138 See generally RATNER, supra note 1, at 13-16.
139 HEININGER, supra note 135, at 66.
140 S.C. Res. 1272, supra note 89.
141 Agreement Regarding the Modalities for the Popular Consultation of the East Timorese Through a
Direct Ballot, supra note 76.
142 Traditional treaty law focuses on the consent of states, but this may not be an adequate basis for
consent. "Clearly, consent demands a settlement with the concurrence of the principal holders of effective
power in the affected state or states." RATNER, supra note 1, at 28-29.
143 Ratner notes that different settlement plans and the related peacekeeping operations will evince
more or less firm, durable consent: "[Ilt would seem that those negotiated directly by all the parties
representing effective sources of power in the conflict, out of a genuine sprit of reconciliation, are most
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Cambodian case, consent was never withdrawn, but it did erode.
Cambodian factions agreed to a UN-led transition to democracy, but their
consent disintegrated as various parties refused to disarm or meaningfully
participate. In contrast, the East Timorese collaborated closely with
UNTAET and the political personalities and parties remained committed to
the transitional plan.
A. Consent in Cambodia
One of the problems in the Cambodian case was the fluidity of
consent to the UNTAC mission.' 44 As UNTAC worked to implement its
mandate, the quality of parties' consent affected its ability to be effective.1
45
From the beginning of the peace process, consent within Cambodia on the
settlement was fragmented. 146  The parties' consent to the Overall
Agreement was due in part to pressure by their external sponsors, such as the
former Soviet Union, Vietnam, and China, rather than to true
reconciliation. 47 The factions' competing visions of the accord undermined
likely to lay the groundwork for smooth, though hardly incident-free, second-generation peacekeeping
missions." RATNER, supra note 1, at 29.
144 Commenting on the unprecedented degree of authority that UNTAC assumed, Doyle noted that,
"In Cambodia.... this authority was exercised with the formal consent of the four parties to Cambodia's
long civil strife under terms negotiated in a comprehensive framework and embodied in the Paris
Agreements of 1991. But this consent proved to be fluid; all the parties resisted, and one, the Khmer
Rouge, withdrew altogether and attacked UNTAC itself." DOYLE, supra note 1, at 13. "[Aluthentic and
firm consent in the aftermath of severe civil strife such as that Cambodia endured is rare." Id. at 87.
145 DOYLE, supra note 1, at 66, 68-70.
[Tihe non-cooperation of parties to the October 1991 Paris Agreement--principally the
Khmer Rouge and the State of Cambodia-made key provisions of the peace plan
virtually impossible to implement. Although the power-sharing problem in the
transitional period was only set aside by enshrining the 'sovereignty, independence and
unity of Cambodia in the SNC, UNTAC's timetable was still predicated on the
assumption that all four factions would be committed to the peace process. The UNTAC
operation was thus based firmly on traditional principles of peacekeeping without
provision being made for enforcing any aspect of the plan submitted by Secretary-
General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, for approval by the Security Council on 19 February
1992. As the Secretary-General himself put it shortly before the elections, UNTAC could
only solve problems "through dialogue, persuasion, negotiation and diplomacy."
Berdal & Leifer, supra note 26, at 37.
4' "The [internal) factions only unwillingly succumbed to the pressure of their outside supporters,
who had tired of the Cambodia conflict." RATNER, supra note 1, at 158.
147 DOYLE, supra note 1, at 16-18 (setting out the Cambodian factions and their external sponsors).
"The agreements between the Cambodians which the Paris Accords embodied were extremely fragile, not
only because of the bitterness and the animosities aroused by decades of civil war but also because
fundamentally they were the product of efforts made by the international community rather than by
Cambodians themselves." FINDLAY, supra note 12, at 16.
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the consensual foundation of the UN peacekeeping mission.148  As one
commentator has observed, "With such tenuous consent, the smallest action
by the UN against the interests of a party would be met with entrenched
resistance, accusations of bias or violations of the accord, and impasse."
149
An unexpected problem was the figure of Prince Sihanouk, who had
been expected to play a unifying role. Instead, Sihonouk alternately avoided
responsibilities and demanded that UNTAC defer to his decisions-
eventually opting out of the process altogether. 150 A great factor in the
fragility of the consent underpinning UNTAC was the volatility of the
internal parties. Far from cooperating with UNTAC as promised, the Khmer
Rouge actively resisted UNTAC's authority, fearing loss of control over its
territory. 151 In addition, SOC cooperation was limited if not superficial.
152
Furthermore, in 1992, these two groups became embroiled in violence: the
Khmer Rouge massacred ethnic Vietnamese, and the SOC retaliated by
killing Khmer Rouge officials. 153  The violence spread when the Khmer
Rouge attacked UNTAC personnel, killing twenty-four people.' 54 When the
results of the UNTAC organized elections were announced, SOC alleged
that the vote was unfair and initially withheld its recognition of the results. 1
55
UNTAC's consent basis began to dissolve. "[I]n terms of resources,
planning and execution, the UN operation suffered from major limitations
which were not conducive to a lasting settlement."' 156 The consequence of
these developments was that UNTAC had to fulfill its charge in war-like
148 RATNER, supra note 1, at 158.
149 id.
150 "Further complicating the UN's task of bringing stability to Cambodia was the erratic attitude and
behavior of Norodom Sihanouk throughout the transitional period." Berdal & Leifer, supra note 26, at 37.
See also RATNER, supra note 1, at 159-60.
151 RATNER, supra note 1, at 158.
52 id.
'51 Id. at 158-59.
'34 Id. at 159.
155 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of Resolution 840 (1993), U.N. SCOR,
47th Sess., at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/26090 (1993).
156 Berdal & Leifer, supra note 26, at 37:
With the notable exceptions of its electoral and repatriation components, as well as that
part of the civil administration responsible for information, the UN operation in
Cambodia demonstrated that the Organisation was ill equipped to initiate and sustain
large-scale multi-component missions. UNTAC's operational efficiency was adversely
affected by weakness in areas of logistics organization and of command, control and
communications. The quality of some of the troops and civilian personnel serving with
the authority was also open to question.
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conditions.' 57 In addition, the SNC never developed into a body for national
reconciliation, which required UNTAC to undertake more responsibilities,
eroding the consent basis of the council. 158
The interaction of these two adverse factors, non-cooperation
by the parties concerned and structural weaknesses in the UN
peacekeeping machinery, resulted in a situation that, by the
time the operation was completed in September 1993, differed
markedly from that envisaged by the eighteen signatories to the
Paris Agreement in October 1991. "9
B. UNTAET and Consent
In East Timor the peace settlement gained a great deal of external and
internal momentun. Although Indonesia and Portugal were the only parties
to the Agreement, there was widespread acceptance of the peace settlement.
Many factors coincided to place pressure on Indonesia to allow the East
Timorese to vote on self-determination, including international pressure in
support of a political settlement. 
6
Under international law, the UN requires the consent of host states for
peacekeeping missions if the Security Council does not invoke its Chapter
VII peace enforcement powers, but does not require consent from non-state
actors. 16  However, the consent bases of a peacekeeping mission are
stronger if there is clear support for the UN's presence by the non-state
actors in effective power.' 62 In addition to external pressure to resolve the
question of East Timor's status, there was growing support within East
Timor in the late 1990s for a UN role in the settlement.' The support for
151 RATNER, supra note 1, at 159.
158 Id.
159 Berdal & Leifer, supra note 26, at 37.
16o See supra notes 55 to 73 and accompanying text. See generally Taylor, supra note 38, at 20-34
(describing the peacemaking process in which Indonesia was compelled to accept a settlement including
election options of both autonomy or independence for East Timor).
161 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
162 RATNER, supra note 1, at 28-29.
163 Louise Williams, Students Meet MPs, Push For Referendum, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, June
16, 1998, at 8 (describing a pro-independence protest where students demanded UN intervention and
rejected Habibie's suggestion of a special autonomous status for East Timor); East Timor's Gusmdo Calls
for UN Peacekeeping Force, AFX NEWS (AP), Apr. 6, 1999 (reporting that pro-independence leader
Xanana Gusnmlo called for a UN peacekeeping force to be sent to East Timor to halt factional violence);
Leaders Call To Arms, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Apr. 8, 1999, at 14 (recounting the call to arms of by
Xanana Gusmko in the absence of a UN peacekeeping mission, as well as a Bishop Carlos Belo's proposal
for the UN to send a team of human rights monitors).
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the UN was not universal. There were reports of East Timorese public
officials using their offices and public funds to campaign for autonomy and
exerting pressure on civil servants to vote for their position. 164 Also, some
commentators believed the violent clashes between pro-Indonesian and pro-
independence groups surrounding the peace settlement indicated that the
goals of the election plan were not realizable. 6 5 However, the results of the
August 30, 1999 elections demonstrated that an overwhelming majority of
East Timorese supported independence from Indonesia. 166 The 78.5% vote
for independence from Indonesia solidified the East Timorese support for
UNTAET.
The effect of the election in strengthening consent differentiates the
East Timor case from Cambodia. In Cambodia, the factious history of the
parties and the external funding of the various factions created an
atmosphere of non-cooperation and politicking. In contrast, no parties opted
out of the election process in East Timor.' 67 High voter turnout and large
majorities produced elections that reinforced consent, rather than eroding it,
as had occurred in Cambodia.
UNTAET's administrative structure also safeguarded against the
erosion of consent. 68  UNTAET's administrative control meant that its
mandate to help East Timor transition to an independent government could
be implemented by UNTAET directly, rather than through the kind of
domestic council that slowed UNTAC's process in Cambodia. While
UNTAET's mandate was to establish a working administration with East
Timorese, it worked to implement the 2001 elections with a National
Council whose" members were appointed by the Transitional
Administrator.1 69 East Timorese participation in the administration was a
top priority from the beginning. However, unlike some of the Cambodian
164 Question of East Timor: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 16, U.N. Doc.
S/1999/803 (1999).
165 Seth Mydans, With Peace Accord at Hand, East Timor's War Deepens, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26,
1999, at A3 (reporting that many analysts feared that settlement would ignite worse conflict); Seth Mydans,
Violence as East Timor Awaits Vote Count, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1999, at A8.
166 Secretary-General Informs Security Council People of East Timor Rejected Special Autonomy
Proposed by Indonesia, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., Press Release, U.N. Doc. SC/6721 (1999).
167 Seth Mydans, The Timor Enigma, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1999, at A12 (reporting that pro-Indonesia
militias inexplicably backed off, and that the August 30, 1999 elections were peaceful).
168 Compare Joel Beauvais, Benevolent Despotism: A Critique of U.N. State-Building in East Timor,
33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL 1101 (2001) (arguing that there were tensions between UNTAET's mandate
to govern East Timor and to build capacity for self-governance at the same time).
169 Financing of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor: Report of the
Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., at 6, 1 14, U.N. Dc. A/55/443 (2000).
170 Question of East Timor: Progress Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 99, at 8, 1 41.
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parties that had been in de facto control over portions of Cambodia, East
Timor did not have any party that had been officially governing the country.
Although the UNTAET's mandate did not include the integration of any
official East Timorese parties into the process, it called upon different East
Timorese leaders to participate.17'
The governing structure between the 1999 and 2001 elections also
helped to reinforce a broad East Timorese consent. Pursuant to the authority
vested in the Secretary-General's Special Representative ('Transitional
Administrator") under Security Council Resolution 1272, Sergio Vieira de
Mello promulgated a series of regulations establishing the interim law-
making structure. 172 Under these regulations, the Transitional Administrator
created the National Consultative Council (later the "National Council") to
"be the primary mechanism through which the representatives of the people
of East Timor shall actively participate in the decision making process
during the period of the [UNTAET], and through which the views, concerns,
traditions and interests of the East Timorese people will be represented.'
73
The membership of the National Council was to include seven
A top priority of UNTAET is the establishment of a close consultation and liaison with
the East Timorese. Working with Alexandre Gusmio of CNRT and other East Timorese
leaders, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General has reached agreement on a
National Consultative Commission. UNTAET will ensure that through this consultative
mechanism, and by close liaison throughout all sectors of the administration, the needs
and wishes of the East Timorese people are fully represented in the implementation of the
transitional administration.
Id.
171 The Report on the Secretary-General on the Situation in East Timor, supra note 83, at 47:
In all elements of the functioning of the governance and public administration elements
of UNTAET, the United Nations will work on the basis of the principles of participation
and capacity-building. This will involve assigning East Timorese to positions within the
transitional administrative structures to be established, where qualified individuals are
available and can be identified. Where such persons are not available, UNTAET will
nevertheless assign East Timorese to serve in positions inside the administrative
structures together with international counterparts, and deliver sufficient training and
capacity-building to enable these persons gradually to replace international staff. This
will allow for the development throughout the duration of UNTAET, of a cadre of well-
trained East Timorese capable of performing the administrative and public service
functions necessary to support an independent East Timor.
Id.
172 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor,
U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2000/53 (2000); Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor: Addendum, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., at 5-8, U.N. Doe.
S/2000/53/Add.1 (2000) (setting out Regulations No. 1999/2: On the Establishment of a National
Consultative Council).
'" Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor:
Addendum, supra note 172, at 5, §1, item 1.2.
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representatives from the largest political group in East Timor, the National
Council of East Timorese Resistance ("CNRT"), three representatives from
other political groups existing prior to the 1999 elections, one representative
from the Roman Catholic Church in East Timor, three UNTAET members to
be selected by the Transitional Administrator, and the Transitional
Administrator himself. 17 4  This makeup reflected the results of the 1999
popular elections. 175  The National Council was charged with the
responsibility to make policy recommendations, and to strive for consensus
in its decisions. 176  In addition to its policy-making role, the National
Council was assigned to consult with East Timorese civil society, including
religious groups, women, and youth. 177  Through these mechanisms, the
Transitional Authority created a quasi-governmental council, roughly
representative of the political alliances of the 1999 elections, that was to
consult with civil society in creating policy for the newly-independent East
Timor.
The civic education component of UNTAET further fortified East
Timorese consent. In 1999, UNAMET fulfilled the education part of its
mandate with a public education plan to disseminate information about the
independence vote. 7 8  UNTAET continued this mandate, and worked to
rebuild public information and communication networks. 179 As part of this
effort, UNTAET conducted an information campaign to clarify its role and
to explain the decision making process during the transition period.1
80
UNTAET also encouraged public participation in the constitutional
development process, providing civic education through training, mass
information, and multiple civil society initiatives.1
l 1
'74 Id. at 6, § 2.
'7 id. at 6, § 2, item 2.3.
176 Id. at 6, § 3.
'77 ld. at 6, § 4.
178 Question of East Timor: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., p. 4, 1 19-21,
U.N. Doc. S/1999/595 (1999) (explaining the information component of the elections, including radio,
television, and print media); see also Civic Education Materials from the United Nations Mission in East
Timor(UNAMET), at http://www.un.org/peacecetimor99/index.body.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2002).
1 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor,
U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., p. 14-15, 64-66, U.N. Doc. S/2000/53 (2000); Report of the Secretary-General
on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (for the period 27 July 2000 to 16
Januaw 2001), U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., p. 8, T 41-42, U.N. Doc. S/2001/42 (2001). "
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor,
U.N. SCOR, supra note 172, at 15, 1 65.
181 Interim Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in
East Timor, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., at 1, 4, U.N. Doc. S/2001/436 (2001).
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VI. SCOPE AND STRENGTH OF THE UN PEACEKEEPING MANDATE
Many authors studying second-generation peacekeeping have created
analytic frameworks in which to assess transitional authorities.' 82  This
Comment analyzes the scope and strength of the UN transitional schemes in
East Timor and Cambodia in a simplified framework for an introductory
comparison of UNTAC and UNTAET.
A. Scope of Authority
UNTAET's scope of the authority was much greater than UNTAC's.
In the case of UNTAC, the scope of authority was not sufficient to carry out
its mandate. 183  In comparison, UNTAET had greater authority over the
administration of East Timor.184 Three key areas demonstrate the different
authority granted to UNTAC and UNTAET: policing, administration and
elections.
1. Military and Civilian Policing
First, UNTAC and UNTAET had different military and civilian
policing authority. UNTAET had broad policing authority while the
authority of UNTAC was limited. In Cambodia, the cease-fire set out in the
Paris Agreement reduced the level of fighting, but did not eliminate it.
185
Therefore, there was a great need for UNTAC to monitor and ensure the
peace. However, UNTAC was empowered only to verify the withdrawal of
foreign forces and arms reduction.!86 While there are differin 8?erspectives
on UNTAC's success in fulfilling its disarmament mandate, the Khmer
Rouge's withdrawal from the process created a huge barrier to
182 See, e.g., THE UNITED NATIONS TRANSmoNAL AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA (UNTAC): DEBRIEFING
AND LESSONS 9-39 (Nassrine Azimi ed., 1995) (analyzing UNTAC in terms of its various components);
DOYLE, supra note 1, at 32-71 (breaking down different categories on which to assess UNTAC's successes
and failures); RATNER, supra note 1, at 41-50, 138-39.
183 Berdal & Leifer, supra note 26, at 57-58 (arguing that UNTAC's responsibilities were not
underpinned by the authority or capability to ensure that the Cambodian parties complied with the Paris
Agreement).
94 Strohmeyer, supra note 2, at 46-47.
s5 Berdal & Leifer, supra note 26, at 41.
1s6 Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, supra note 18, at
24-25.
187 HEININGER, supra note 135, at 66-72 (arguing that UNTAC administrators refused to use force to
ensure compliance with disarmament, that UNTAC's military and security deployment was slow, and that
UNTAC lacked the power to enforce the cease-fire); see also RATNER, supra note 1, at 169-72 (arguing
that UNTAC did impressive preparatory work for the disarmament phase, but that UNTAC was unable to
fulfill its disarmament mandate due to Khmer Rouge's withdrawal from the process).
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disarmament. 188  "UNTAC's mandate contained no mechanism to enforce
the cease-fire agreement. As a result, when disarmament did not take place,
cease-fire violations increased." 189
UNTAC had similar difficulties enacting its civilian policing powers.
Experts identified different causes for the ineffectiveness of the civilian
police power. One view was that UNTAC took an overly conservative
approach when implementing the policing powers it did possess.1 90 For
example, after several politically motivated assassinations, UNTAC did not
deploy a UN police force to counteract the breakdown of law and order. 191
A second view was that UNTAC's civilian police program was poorly
conceived and implemented. 192 Regardless of the cause, UNTAC's civilian
police component was ineffective at preventing or responding to violence193
and was not even able to ensure the safety of its own personnel. 94
UNTAC's military and civilian policing authority was not sufficient to fulfill
the scale of the mandates with which it was charged.
The implementation of UNTAET's military and civilian policing
mandate differed on several counts. First, although both Cambodia and East
Timor experienced violence as a result of the elections, the violence in East
Timor did not occur during the elections of 1999, but afterwards, once the
outcome was announced. 95 This meant that the East Timor election
environment was more politically neutral than that in Cambodia. Another
difference is that UNTAET had missions that preceded it. UNTAET's
policing powers came about as a result of the successes and failures of those
earlier missions. The UN organization administering the elections,
UNAMET, did not have a strong peacekeeping mandate, 96 and experts
88 HEININGER, supra note 135, at 70-72.
199 id. at 70.
19 Cf. DOYLE, supra note 1, at 67 (noting that although the Paris Agreement seemingly endorsed the
use of force against one or more opposing factions, UNTAC administrators followed a policy of avoiding
the use of force, despite outside criticism of their inaction).
'9' Berdal & Leifer, supra note 26, at 44.
192 HEININGER, supra note 135, at 78-81 (explaining that deficiencies in the civil police component
("CIVPOL") made it ineffective); see also RATNER, supra note 1, at 172 (arguing that CIVPOL was
plagued by internal and logistical problems).
"The civil police were charged with ensuring that law and order was maintained effectively and
impartially, and that human rights and fundamental freedoms were fully protected. It quickly became
apparent that this was an impossible task given the small number of police officers available." HEININGER,
supra note 135, at 79.
194 Berdal & Leifer, supra note 26, at 41 (reporting that UNTAC lost fifty-six members of its forces
in an attack, its personnel were kidnapped, and their equipment was frequently stolen).
195 See supra notes 83 to 88 and accompanying text.
196 S.C. Res. 1246, supra note 81, at 13, 10 (establishing UNAMET to conduct the 1999 elections and
welcoming Indonesia's decision to monitor and ensure the security of the election).
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argue over whether the post-election violence in 1999 was foreseeable.
197
Either way, INTERFET re-established peace and security in East Timor,
tg9
and UNTAET has been successful in maintaining the peace since 1999,
including during the 2001 constituent elections.
199
Two major security concerns existed as UNTAET took administrative
control over East Timor: border security and on-going militia activity.2
z°
As the UN began to develop UNTAET's security mandate, INTERFET
administrators cautioned that "[g]iven the continuing volatile security
situation in East Timor, the successor force to INTERFET should have a
robust operational mandate." 201  When the Security Council adopted
Resolution 1272, establishing UNTAET, it based the mission's mandate on
Chapter VII of the UN Charter in order to authorize the transitional mission
to take all "necessary measures to fulfill its mandate." 20 2 Resolution 1272
also set out clear guidelines for the transition from INTERFET to
UNTAET.
203
2. Civil Administration Mandate
The difference between the authority of UNTAC and that of
UNTAET is also illustrated by their civil administration mandates. Creating
an effective civil administration, unprejudiced by corruption or politics, is
197 Compare Toole, supra note 83 (criticizing the UN for failing to negotiate the most basic element
of their role in conducting and monitoring elections: security), with MARrIN, supra note 39, at 121-22
(arguin that the violence following the 1999 independence election was not foreseeable).
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
199 I1.; see also Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in
East Timor, supra note 172, at p. 4-6, 1 14-24 (reporting on the security situation after UNTAET took over
the administration of East Timor); Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor (for the period 27 July 2000 to 16 January 2001), supra note 179, at 2. 10-
11 (reporting on security situation as milita activity continued); Interim Report of the Secretary-General on
the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, supra note 181, at 4, 19-24 (2001)
(reporting that the security situation was good); Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Transitional Administration in East Timor (for the period 25 July to 15 October 2001), U.N. SCOR, 56th
Sess., at 1, 5. U.N. Doc. S/2001/983 (2001) (reporting that the amount of militia activity continued to
decline).
"5 See supra note 88 and accompanying text (reporting INTERFET's activities).
201 Letter Dated 15 October from the Secretary-General Address to the President of the Security
Council, supra note 88, at 6, 1 23.
02 S.C. Res. 1272, supra note 89, at 4.
203 I1 at 1 9 (requesting that the Transitional Administration and the multinational force cooperate
closely with each other, and with a view to replace the multinational force with the military component of
the Transitional Administration).
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necessary for a politically neutral environment in which to conduct free and
fair elections.20"
The Paris Agreements set out a transitional administration for
Cambodia to fulfill this purpose, placing all administrative agencies in the
fields of foreign affairs, national defense, finance, public security, and
information under the direct control of UNTAC.2 °5 Yet, UNTAC did not
have enough actual authority to enact administrative reforms to carry out this
mandate. The Paris Agreements also provided that UNTAC would work
with the SNC in its administrative capacity.206 Although the SNC consisted
of the four Cambodian parties, only the SOC had governmental structures.0 7
When UNTAC tried to exert its administrative authority, it found that it was
unable to control the SOC administration. 20 8  SOC officials were
obstructionist and UNTAC was unable to monitor or control governmental
agencies. 209 "UNTAC tried hard to institute a neutral administration and an
active SNC, but the SOC was determined to maintain its authority, placing
the UNTAC beyond realization." 21 UNTAC had sufficient authority in the
abstract, but within the actual context of Cambodian politics, its civil
administration mandate was not feasible.
In contrast, UNTAET had both the authority to create rules to reform
East Timor and the ability to implement them. UNTAET did not face the
political challenges that UNTAC had in Cambodia, because the
administrative government, Indonesia, pulled out of East Timor after the
1999 elections.2 1 Unlike UNTAC's vague administrative authority,212
UNTAET was granted specific powers that vested it with broad
204 The Paris Agreement Article 6 provides: "In order to ensure a neutral political environment
conducive to free and fair general elections, administrative agencies, bodies and offices which could
directly influence the outcome of elections will be placed under direct United Nations supervision or
control." Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, supra note 18, at
11-12.
20S a d at 22-24.
206 "[T]he Secretary-General's Special Representative, in consultation with the SNC, will identify
which administrative agencies, bodies, and offices could continue to operate in order to ensure normal day-
to-day life in Cambodia, if necessary, under such supervision by UNTAC as it considers necessary." Id at
23,13.
2D7 FINDLAY, supra note 12, at 59.
2 Id. at 60; see also HEININGER, supra note 135, at 88.29 Berdal & Leifer, supra note 26, at 44; see generally FINDLAY, supra note 12, at 59-63.
210 BROWN & ZASLOFF, supra note 33, at 282 (describing in detail the events surrounding the
election).
211 Question of East Timor: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., at 1, 3, U.N.
Doe. S/1999/862 (1999) (providing that if East Timor rejects autonomy in the 1999 election, Indonesia,
Portugal, and the Secretary-General will arrange for a transfer of authority over East Timor to the UN).
2 While the mandate clearly stated that [UNTAC] should be controlling, there were no guidelines
as to how we should exercise control." FINDLAY, supra note 12, at 61 (quoting the comments of Lyndall
McLean, Deputy Director of the Civil Administration Component).
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administrative authority. In Security Council Resolution 1272, UNTAET
was endowed with "overall responsibility for the administration of East
Timor and [was] empowered to exercise all legislative and executive
authority, including the administration of justice. Resolution 1272 also
empowered UNTAET to "enact new laws and regulations and to amend,
suspend or repeal existing ones." 214 Pursuant to these powers, the UNTAET
Transitional Administrator promulgated a series of regulations to implement
elections, establish a National Council, reconstitute the judiciary, encourage
economic development, establish free media, create a public service
commission, and ensure peace and security.2 15
The initial priorities for UNTAET's civil administration were "the
restoration of essential infrastructure, the provision of basic social services,
the recruitment of civil servants and the revival of trade and commerce.
'216
After establishing the basic elements of a public administration, UNTAET
was expected to begin implementing policy; the embryonic professional civil
service was to begin functioning; and public and social services were
expected to improve.2 17 Further, a key objective was to "ensure that the East
Timorese themselves [became] major stakeholders in their own system of
governance and public administration .... An examination of mission
reports demonstrates that UNTAET successfully implemented its
administrative priorities.219 UNTAET had broad authority to implement
reforms and to rebuild East Timor's civil administration.
213 S.C. Res. 1272, supra note 89, at 1.
214 Id. at 6.
215 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor:
Addendum, supra note 172, at 5-8 (setting out Regulations No. 1999/2: On the Establishment of a National
Consultative Council).
216 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor,
supra note 172, at 9, 40.
217 Id. at 9, 40.
218 Id. at 10, 41.
219 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
(for the period 27 July 2000 to 16 January 2001), U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., at 5-6, U.N. Doc. S/2001/42
(2001) (reporting on the significant progress made in repairing infrastructure, reopening of primary and
secondary schools, and reconstruction of hospitals); see also Interim Report of the Secretary-General on
the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, supra note 181, at 4-5 (reporting that
although East Timor will not yet have a fully functional civil administration when it attains independence,
advances have been made in training civil servants); Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Transitional Administration in East Timor (for the period 25 July to 15 October 2001), supra note 199, at
2, 6-3 (reporting that major advances have been made in the past two years in building a civil service and
its institutions from the ground up; reporting infrastructure progress, reporting that much progress has been
achieved in the education sector; and reporting that in the health sector progress has been made in restoring
access to basic services and establishing the policies, systems, and human resources necessary for a
sustainable health system); Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor (for the period 16 October 2001 to 18 January 2002), U.N. SCOR, 57th
Sess., at 1, 2-9, U.N. Doc. S/2002/80 (2002) (reporting on the development in the following fields:
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3. Election Mandates
A final comparison of Cambodian and East Timorese elections
focuses on the effectiveness of UNTAC and UNTAET in fulfilling their
elections mandates. 2 20  UNTAC was unable to ensure a neutral political
environment for the elections. 221  Some observers attributed this to the
inability of UNTAC to disarm the factions and to establish law and order.222
Others believe that the mandate to create a neutral political environment for
223the elections proved more complex to enact than was anticipated. In any
event, the situation worsened as the elections approached. 2 4 Nevertheless,
despite the violence, the elections were relatively peaceful; nearly ninety
percent of registered voters cast ballots, and the Security Council endorsed
the election in which the FUNCINPEC won the majority. 225
Many experts praise UNTAC for its role in successfully conducting
elections while facing many political and security challenges. 226  This
victory was short-lived, despite the apparent success of the democratic
process in the elections. The plan in the Paris Agreements to establish a
democratic government in Cambodia did not extend to the post-election
period.227 Immediately after the elections, the Cambodian People's Party
("CCP"), the party of the Khmer Rouge, which failed to win the majority in
228the assembly, contested the results. Prince Sihanouk, who was acting as
the president of the SNC, made a deal with the CCP and declared himself
head of state in charge of an interim coalition government of the CCP and
professional administration, justice, foreign affairs East Timor Defense Force, East Timor Police Service,
public information, security, refugee returns, economic and social progress, education, infrastructure,
development of natural resources, agriculture, and fisheries).2  See Sue Downie, The United Nations in East Timor: Comparisons with Cambodia, in GUNS AND
BALLOT BOXES: EASTTIMOR'S VOTE FOR INDEPENDENCE 117-34 (Damien Kingsbury ed., 2000).
221 HEININGFR, supra note 135, at 100 (reporting that the factions were not disarmed before the
elections and that violence increased as the elections approached); see generally BROWN & ZASLOFF, supra
note 33, at 131-61 (describing in detail the events surrounding the election).
2n Berdal & Leifer, supra note 26, at 54; see also DOYLE, supra note 1, at 34 (arguing that UNTAC's
inability to achieve a cease-fire and disarmament had devastating effects on the politically neutral
environment that was necessary for the elections).
223 RATNER, supra note 1, at 173; cf HEININGER, supra note 135, at 100-06 (arguing that the
implementation of UNTAC's elections mandate suffered from poor logistics).
224 Berdal & Leifer, supra note 26, at 54.
2 Id. at 55; HEININGER, supra note 135, at 113-14.
226 DOYLE, supra note 1, at 32-34; HEININGER, supra note 135, at 115-16; RATNER, supra note 1, at
180-81.
227 "According to the Paris Agreements, the new Cambodian government was to be a 'liberal
democracy.'" BROWN & ZASLOFF, supra note 33, at 286; id. at 165-89 (describing the months following
the elections and the political tumult that erupted).
22 HEININGER, supra note 135, at 113.
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the FUNCINPEC.2 29 Eventually, the political hotbed cooled and the
constituent assembly passed a new democratic constitution and reinstated the
monarchy, enthroning Norodom Sihanouk again.230 The political coalition
remained vulnerable, because the CPP remained dominant in the
administration, armed forces and police.231 Additionally, the Khmer Rouge
continued to exploit the internal tensions in an attempt to regain political
power.232  A year after the elections, "Cambodia had reverted to civil
conflict despite the evident achievements of United Nations
,,233peacekeeping.
In contrast, UNTAET successfully implemented its mandates
following the 1999 and 2001 elections. Following the 1999 election,
UNTAET worked to establish the National Consultative Council (later the
"National Council") to "create a proper framework for involving the East
Timorese in the administration of the Territory.'234 A growing consensus
arose among the East Timorese to begin the political transition to
independence, and so UNTAET began planning the 2001 constituent
elections. 235  The UNTAET conducted peaceful elections on August 30,
2001.236 Over ninety percent of the eligible voters participated.237  The
Independent Electoral Commission certified the results on September 10,
and the Security Council's Special Representative, Sergio Vieira de Mello,
swore in eighty-eight members of the Constituent Assembly.2 38 The
Constituent Assembly proposed that East Timor declare its independence on
May 20, 2002, which the Security Council endorsed.239 On March 22, 2002,
after considering suggestions made by the public on its content, the
Constituent Assembly adopted a constitution, which provides for a division
of powers between the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches of
229 id.
23o Berdal & Leifer, supra note 26, at 56.231 id.
232 id.
23 Id. at 56-57.
234 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor,
supra note 172, at 2, 4; Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor: Addendum, supra note 172, at 5-8 (setting out Regulations No. 1999/2: On
the Establishment of a National Consultative Council).
235 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
(for the period 27 July 2000 to 16 January 2001), supra note 219.
236 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
(for the period 25 July to 15 October 2001), supra note 199, at 1, T 5.
737 See iL at 1, 5.
238 See id.
29 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
(for the period 16 October 2001 to 18 January 2002), supra note 219, at 1, 3. For further information on
the Constituent Assembly and drafting the constitution, see id. 5-10.
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government. 240 The assembly conducted presidential elections on April 14,
2002 in which Xanana Gusmo won the majority.24'
B. Strength of the Transitional Plans
Transitional peacekeeping missions require an enormous level of
planning, logistics, and coordination. Most experts agree that there were
weaknesses in the design of UNTAC. 242 Significantly, the UNTAC plan
was ad hoc in the sense that it had no central authority organizing its many
parts. 243 "Each component of UNTAC [was] planned separately, rather than
as a part of an overall mission. ' 244 Decision-making was organized only on
a "component-by-component" basis, because there were insufficient
procedures for sharing information and coordinating responses. 245 The ad
hoc character of UNTAC had a great impact on its implementation. It meant
frequent slow-starts and system breakdowns. For example, UNTAC was not
deployed until five months after the Paris Agreements were signed.246
Staffing problems also resulted from poor planning. Personnel deployment
was sluggish and the hiring system was cumbersome.247 The training and
quality of UNTAC personnel also suffered in the absence of coordination. 248
Frequently, personnel had no previous peacekeeping experience or relevant
language skills. 249 As a result, it would not have been logistically possible to
m Joanna Jolly, East Timor Approves Its Constitution, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar 22, 2002, at
http://story.news.yahoo.conm/news?tmp=story&u=/ap/20020322tapornre-as/east-timor-constitution-6
(last visited Mar. 22, 2002); Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., at 1, 9 4-5, U.N. Doc. S/2002/432 (reporting the
Mar. 22, 2002 adoption of the East Timor Constitution, which provides for a unitary democratic state based
on the rule of law and the principle of separation of powers).
41 Landslide Win in East Timor Vote, BBC NEwS, Apr. 17, 2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
hi/english/world/asia-pacific/newsid_1934000/1934379.stm (last visited Apr. 28, 2002); Report of the
Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, supra note 240, at 2,
H 7-8.
242 "It is clear in retrospect that [UNTAC's] implementation plan, unprecedented in scope and
complexity, contained some major weaknesses." Berdal & Leifer, supra note 26, at 39.
243 FINDLAY, supra note 12, at 122.
24 HEININGER, supra note 135, at 124; see also FINDLAY, supra note 12, at 123-27 (discussion the
deficiencies in UNTACs management and administrative structure, specifically the need for better strategic
coordination).
245 RATNER, supra note 1, at 196.
246 BROWN & ZASLOFF, supra note 33, at 279.
247 HEININGER, supra note 135, at 124.
248 Berdal & Leifer, supra note 26, at 52-54; see also DOYLE, supra note 1, at 59-64 (outlining
administrative, planning, and staffing problems); HEININGER, supra note 135, at 126-27 (explaining
UNTAC's coordination problems and the effect this lack of coordination on staff and staffing).249 BROWN & ZASLOFF, supra note 33, at 279-80.
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implement the UNTAC mandate within the assigned time frame of eighteen
months, even if conditions had been perfect.
250
In contrast, UNTAET had good coordination between its
organizational units and synchronization with the UNAMET and
INTERFET missions that preceded it in East Timor. A lot of planning
preceded the transition as UNTAET took over the administration of East
Timor. In Resolution 1272, which created UNTAET, the Security Council
explicitly directed that UNTAET cooperate with the earlier missions to
create a smooth transition.251 UNTAET sufficiently staffed all departments,
252including the peacekeepers. In addition, the East Timor Transitional
Administration, established to "integrate East Timorese into all major
decision-making areas within the Administration," hired thousands of East
Timorese as civil servants.253 UNTAET also made significant progress in
rebuilding the infrastructure: rehabilitating ports, the airport, telephone and
power networks, and water systems.254  The Security Council extended
UNTAET's mission when the timeline demanded it, making the work more
feasible.25 5 UNTAET planned that when control shifted back to the East
Timorese a fully functional civil administration would be in place.
2 56
Besides coordinating transitions, UNTAET was to coordinate with other
international organizations. "Given UNTAET's comprehensive mandate for
humanitarian relief, governance and development, an effort was made to
coordinate and integrate from the start the different activities and actors to
ensure that their efforts were mutually supporting and reflected the same set
of priorities. 257 Consideration was also given to coordination among UN
250 Berdal & Leifer, supra note 26, at 39-40. "The experience of UNTAC clearly suggests, therefore,
that a greater degree of financial, administrative and operational authority should be delegated to the field
in future operations." Id. at 51.
251 S.C. Res. 1272, supra note 89, at [ 9; see also Letter Dated 15 October from the Secretary-
General Address to the President of the Security Council, supra note 88, at 6 (reporting that in order to
achieve a timely transition to UNTAET, the planning process should be accelerated; noting that early
appointments of senior leadership will facilitate the transition).
'2 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
(for the period 27 July 2000 and 16 January 2001), supra note 219, at 8-9, 43-45 (breaking down the
personnel statistics of the military observers, civilian police, and staff).
'5' See id. at 3, 16-17.
254 See id. at 5-6, 28-30; see also Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Transitional Administration in East Timor (for the period 16 October 2001 to 18 January 2002), supra note
219, at 8, 55-60.
2" S.C. Res. 1392, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1392 (2002).
256 Interim Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in
East Timor, supra note 181 at 4-5, 25; Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Transitional Administration in East Timor, supra note 199 (setting out the transition to independence after
UNTAET pulls out of East Timor).
2" Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor,
supra note 172, at 3-4, 1I (describing the coordination efforts between UNTAET, the United Nations
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agencies. The UN established a Task Force on East Timor to ensure
coordination among the Secretariat departments, agencies, funds, and
programs concerned.
VII. IMPACT OF UNTAC AND UNTAET ON UN PEACEKEEPING
UNTAC and UNTAET have been hailed as ambitious efforts in the
new era of UN peacekeeping.2 59  Both marked a change in UN
peacekeeping, in which peacekeeping missions assumed administrative
authority.26 ° UNTAC has been viewed by some as a qualified success,261
and by others as a failure, while experts are only just beginning to analyze
UNTAET. However, their strengths and weaknesses illustrate the direction
the UN should pursue when aiding in peacemaking and peacekeeping.
Contrasting the apparent shortfalls of UNTAC with the successes of
UNTAET simplifies the complex situations in. which these missions took
place. In many ways, UNTAET benefited from the lessons the UN learned
from prior missions. When UNTAC was conceived, the United Nations had
no experience planning a mission as large and complex as the one it
263
envisioned in Cambodia. A comparison between UNTAC and UNTAET
indicates that UN transitional peacekeeping missions are becoming more
effective as they evolve.
New trends in peacekeeping challenge older notions of sovereignty
and consent in international law. Critics argue that new peacekeeping is
coercive, imperialistic, or constitutes an undesirable policy shift away from•26
traditional notions of sovereignty and international law. The transitional
Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund). "UNTAET
has established a structure to ensure the overall coordination of externally funded programs." Id. at 4, 113.
" Id. at 4,9 13.
259 'The United Nations operation in Cambodia during 1992-93 was, at the time, the most ambitious
and expensive undertaking in the peacekeeping experience of the Organisation." Berdal & Leifer, supra
note 26, at 25.
m_ 'There simply was no prior equivalent in which the UN took over an existing governmental
structure as part of the peace settlement process." DOYLE, supra note 1, at 36.
26 Michael W. Doyle, Ian Johnston, & Robert C. Orr, Strategies for Peace: Conclusions and
Lessons, in KEEPING THE PEACE: MULTIDIMENSIONAL UN OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA AND EL SALVADOR
369, 374 (Michael W. Doyle, Ian Johnston, and Robert C. Orr eds., 1997).
262 See generally, PIERRE P. LIZIE, PEACE, POWER AND RESISTANCE IN CAMBODIA: GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE AND FAILURE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION (2000).
263 HEININGER, supra note 135, at 123.
264 Traub, supra note 60, at 79-80 (arguing that the UN's nation-building endeavors are in danger of
intruding on sovereignty); Mark Weisburg, International Law and the Problem of Evil, 34 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 225 (2001) (arguing that international humanitarian intervention imposed by international
law amounts to alien domination based on international consent, but ignores the consent of the governed,
and conflicts with other fundamental principles of international law).
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authority model might not be appropriate for every situation, and
peacekeeping strategies might not be replicable.265  Nevertheless, these
criticisms do not negate the benefits of peacekeeping. The UN should be
responsive to critics, but the growing call for international involvement and
aid to struggling regions will place on going pressure to use the
peacekeeping authority of the UN. The peacekeeping role is one of the
core purposes of the UN, and the UN is in the best position to organize'
resources for peacekeeping ventures.
267
UNTAC and UNTAET show that broad consent helps create a solid
foundation for UN peacekeeping, while the lack of consent undermines the
268
efforts of the UN. The UN can build consent by planning a strategy to
win and keep popular support and promote the backing of local forces of
order.2 69 The UN can also create broad bases for consent by including non-
governmental actors in the dialogue. 270  UNTAET used both of these
strategies, expanding the notion of consent to include local politicians, as
well as ordinary citizens and grassroots organizations. The durable consent
in the East Timor case made UNTAET stronger and ultimately more
effective than UNTAC.
UN missions in Cambodia and East Timor indicate that peacekeeping
can be a valid international response to intrastate disputes. UNTAC and
UNTAET also show that the UN can play a more active role in nation-
building exercises to ensure greater success for regions in transition.
UNTAET demonstrates that the UN has the capacity to plan and execute
peacekeeping missions with a broad mandate to create the pre-conditions for
a successful independent state.
265 "[G]iven the conventions and limitations of peacekeeping, democratic multiparty elections within
a short and finite time period are not necessarily a replicable means with which to secure so-called
comprehensive political settlements." Berdal & Leifer, supra note 26, at 58.
RATNER, supra note 1, at 4 (suggesting that there will be more situations in the future that suggest
UN involvement through its peacekeeping auspices).
167 Id. at 5.
2" Doyle, Johnston, & Orr, supra note 261, at 369-91, 374-75, 386-87.
m DOYLE, supra note 1, at 83-84.
270 See id. at 85.
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